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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : Case No. 20080027-CA 
ADMIRAL BEVERAGE CORPORATION, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant filed its petition for an interlocutory appeal on January 16, 2008. 
R. 875. This action came within the original jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j) (Laws 2008, c. 3). On January 17, 2008, the 
Utah Supreme Court transferred this action to this Court pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. R. 877. On January 30, 2008, this Court granted the 
defendant's petition as to "[wjhether the trial court erred in excluding evidence of 
severance damages based on loss of view from the remaining property." R. 895. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Defendant's property abuts 500 West, a street owned by Salt Lake City. 1-15 is 
on the far side of 500 West from the defendant's property. Admiral Beverage sought to 
introduce evidence of damage to its property based upon an alleged loss of view because 
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of the reconstruction of 1-15. This claim involves an easement appurtenant that is 
connected only to the roadway that abuts the property. The distnct court correctly ruled 
that defendant was only entitled to such damages as related to the adjacent roadway (500 
West) and not 1-15. 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW. This issue was raised by the Utah Department 
of Transportation (UDOT) below in a motion in limine. R. 727-35. The district court 
considered this motion and granted it for this reason. R. 863. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Where a motion in limine is granted based on the 
district court's legal conclusions, the decision is reviewed for correctness. UDOT v. 
Ivers, 2005 UT App 519,1J9, 128 P.3d 74, aff d in part and remanded. Ivers v. UDOT. 
2007UT19, 154P.3d802. 
2. The district court excluded Admiral Beverage's evidence of severance damages 
because it included claims for loss of visibility. Defendant was not entitled to present 
such evidence because no such compensable right exists under Utah law. The district 
court properly excluded this evidence. 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW. UDOT raised this issue in two motions in 
limine. R. 151-63,656-64. These motions were considered by the district court and 
granted. R. 495-98, 862-64. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The standard is the same as for the first issue. 
3. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it adopted a prior judge's 
decision instead of overturning it as urged by Admiral Beverage. 
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ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW. Admiral Beverage raised this question in 
opposition to UDOT's motion in limine. R. 767-69. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: It is within the sound discretion of the district court 
to decide whether or not it will reconsider an issue already ruled upon. IHC Health Serv. 
Inc. v. D & K Mgmt, Inc., 2008 UT 36, 1[27, 606 Utah Adv. Rep. 28. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
There are no such provisions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
UDOT brought condemnation proceedings against two adjacent pieces of property 
in the summer of 1997. UDOT did not seek ownership of the entire parcels of land, but 
only portions thereof.1 Admiral Beverage owned one of the properties and purchased the 
other. R. 72-75 in Case No. 970905361. On July 14, 1999, the district court consolidated 
these actions under Case No. 970905361. R. 98-99 in Case No. 970905361; R. 63-64 in 
Case No. 970905368.2 
In January 2005 UDOT filed a motion in limine, asking that the defendant be 
precluded from presenting evidence at trial of severance damages caused by a loss of 
visibility into the noncondemned portions of the property.3 R. 151-63. Admiral Beverage 
1
 UDOT v. Mark Inv. Corp., Case No. 970905361 (R. 11-20) and UDOT v. 
Admiral Beverage Corp., Case No. 970905368 (R. 1-10). 
2
 All further references to the record are to Case No. 970905361. 
3
 The loss of visibility damages were allegedly caused by UDOT's construction 
and modification of the freeway that restricted the remaining property's visibility to 
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filed a motion in limine asking the court to allow several types of severance damage 
evidence, including that caused by loss of visibility and loss of view. R. 168-409. In its 
Memorandum Decision and Order of October 31, 2005, the court granted UDOT's 
motion and denied Admiral Beverage's motion. R. 492-502. The court concluded that no 
claim for loss of visibility from a freeway existed. R. 495-98. 
In May 2006 the district court certified this order as being final pursuant to Utah R. 
Civ. P. 54(b). R. 520-26. Admiral Beverage filed its appeal on May 8, 2006. R. 527-44. 
On August 11, 2006, this Court dismissed that appeal without prejudice because the 
district court's order was not eligible for certification as final under Rule 54(b). 
R. 556-59. 
In August and October of 2007 UDOT filed further motions in limine. R. 656-64, 
727-35. These motions challenged Admiral Beverage's intent to use evidence of 
damages related to its loss of visibility into its property from 1-15. The motions also 
asked the district court to exclude any severance damages claimed to be caused by 
changes to a road or freeway that was not abutting the defendant's property. In opposing 
these motions, defendant claimed that it should be permitted to present evidence of 
damages arising from alleged loss of view out of the remaining property and for loss of 
visibility of the remaining property from 1-15. R. 669-84, 757-75 
travelers on 1-15. R. 152-53. 
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In its minute entry of December 27, 2007, the district court granted UDOT's 
motions. R. 862-67. Defendant filed its petition for an interlocutory appeal on January 
16, 2008. R. 875. This action came within the original jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme 
Court under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)0') (Laws 2008, c. 3). On January 17, 2008, 
the Utah Supreme Court transferred this action to this Court pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. R. 877. On January 30, 2008, this Court granted the 
defendant's petition as to "[wjhether the trial court erred in excluding evidence of 
severance damages based on loss of view from the remaining property." R. 895. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The facts concerning the location of Admiral Beverage's property and how it 
relates to 1-15 are taken from Judge Roth's Memorandum Decision and Order of October 
31, 2005. R. 492-502. The district court found that the facts were not "disputed in any 
material way." R. 493. Plaintiff has not claimed in its opening brief that there was a 
material issue of fact. 
Admiral Beverage owns two adjacent lots that are west of 1-15 in Salt Lake 
County. The property abuts the west side of 500 West, which acts as a frontage road in 
that area. 500 West runs between Admiral Beverage's property and 1-15. R. 664 (map of 
Admiral Beverage's property showing its relationship with 1-15 and the portions to be 
condemned - a copy is attached as Addendum C). 
In connection with the 1-15 reconstruction project, the west side of the 
freeway in that area was moved closer to the Admiral lots, requiring that the 
500 West frontage road also be moved further to the west and onto the east 
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side of Admiral's property, resulting in the condemnation of what are now 
identified as parcels 109 and 110, which are the subject of these 
consolidated cases. 
R. 493. 
The parcels of land taken from Admiral Beverage for the project were used for the 
reconstruction of 500 West. None of it was used for the remodeled 1-15. R. 494. While 
not mentioned by Judge Roth, it is undisputed that both before and after the 
reconstruction of 1-15 access to Admiral Beverage's property was gained by use of 500 
West. R. 657. 
In this appeal, Admiral Beverage challenges the district court's orders granting 
UDOT's three motions in limine. UDOT's first motion asked that the defendant be 
precluded from presenting evidence at trial of severance damages caused by a loss of 
visibility into the noncondemned portions of the property from I-15. R. 151-63. UDOT's 
second motion challenged the appraisal prepared by Jerry Webber because it included the 
same loss-of-visibility damages excluded by the district court's prior order. R. 727-35. 
Defendant acknowledges that Mr. Webber said he was unable to separate damages caused 
from loss of view (out) from damages caused by loss of visibility (in). R. 774; Opening 
Brief of Defendant at 4-6, 13-16. UDOT's third motion asked that severance damages 
claimed to be caused by changes to a road or freeway that was not abutting the 
defendant's property be excluded. R. 656-64. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Admiral Beverage sought to introduce evidence that the value of its property had 
been diminished due to the loss of view and visibility caused by the reconstruction of I-
15. But defendant's property is not adjacent to 1-15. The land is on the west side of 500 
West, which it abuts, while 1-15 is to the east of 500 West. The appurtenant easement of 
view attaches to the abutting roadway (500 West), not to other property or roadways. 
The Utah Supreme Court has expressly held that Utah does not recognize a 
damage claim based on a property's loss of visibility from a roadway. Defendant sought 
to circumvent this decision by seeking damages for loss of visibility as part of a single 
sum including other claims, not as a separate claim for damages. The district court 
correctly rejected this effort. 
Nor should Judge Faust's decision on two motions in limine be reversed simply 
because he adopted a prior decision issued by Judge Roth. While a second judge can 
reconsider a prior judge's decisions in the proper circumstances, there is no duty to do so. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY LIMITED 
DEFENDANT'S EASEMENT FOR VIEW TO THE ABUTTING 
PUBLIC ROAD - 500 WEST 
Admiral Beverage's claims for severance damages for loss of view and visibility 
related to the reconstruction of 1-15. Loss of view damages are caused by obstructions 
that block the view out from that portion of the property that was not condemned. Loss of 
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visibility damages are caused by obstructions that block the view into the noncondemned 
portion of the property from a roadway or highway. 
It is undisputed that the defendant's property was not adjacent to 1-15. 
Defendant's property is divided and separated from 1-15 by 500 West, a street owned by 
Salt Lake City. This physical condition existed both before and after the 1-15 
reconstruction. The district court correctly held that defendant could not claim damages 
for loss of view caused by changes made to a public road that his property did not abut. 
Utah has long recognized that an owner of land adjacent to a public road enjoys a 
right of easement of access, air, light, and view to the public road. In Dooly Block v. Salt 
Lake Rapid Transit, 33 P. 229, 231 (Utah 1893), the court explained that property owners 
adjacent to a public street had the right of access to the street "subject only to the ordinary 
use of the same for the purposes of public travel, and that they are entitled to the use of 
said street, free from unreasonable obstructions, as a means of access, light, and air to 
their premises." 
The appurtenant rights of air, light, and view discussed in Dooly Block and Utah 
State Road Commission v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974) are companion to, and 
derivative of, the easement for physical access. "The rights of access, light, and air are 
easements appurtenant to the land of an abutting owner on a street; they constitute 
property rights forming part of the owner's estate." Miya, 526 P.2d at 928.4 As such, 
4
 "An owner of land abutting on a street is also in possession of an easement of 
view, which constitutes a property right which may not be taken without just 
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they create no right greater than the right to physical access. They consist of the right to 
use the public street for access, light, air and view. They impose no greater burden on the 
public right of way than the servitude necessary to provide the right of access. 
This right of access is properly described as a right appurtenant to property that is 
adjacent to public streets. An appurtenant easement is defined as "[a]n incorporeal right 
which is attached to a superior right and inheres in land to which it is attached and is in 
the nature of a covenant running with the land. There must be a dominant estate and 
servient estate." Black's Law Dictionary 457 (5th ed. 1979) (citations omitted). 
An easement appurtenant... is a privilege which the owner 
of one tenement has the right to enjoy, in respect to that 
tenement in or over the tenement of another person. 
Dansie v. Hi-Countrv Estates, 2004 UT App 149,HI 1, 92 P.3d 162. 
The location of the servitude is at the property boundary adjacent to the public 
right of way. The right does not pass onto the public right of way or cross out the other 
side. Neither does it travel laterally up and down the highway. The right does not extend 
across the adjacent roadway to burden private and public property on the other side of the 
public street to guarantee a view over such property. Utah's courts have regularly 
described the right as one of reasonable access to and from the property to use the public 
road. 
The interest protected simply entails the "right of ingress and egress to and 
from . . . property and the abutting public highway." Harvey's property may 
compensation." Id. at 929. 
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be accessed through both the new frontage road and Old Mountain Road; 
consequently, its right of access has not been denied. The right does not 
extend so far as to guarantee a property owner that his property will be 
accessed through specific intersections or that the roads accessing his 
property will be easily accessed from other thoroughfares. 
State v. Harvev Real Eslate. 2002 UT 107,1J14, 57 P.3d 1088 (citation omitted). 
This approach to the rights appurtenant is also incorporated into Utah Code Ann. 
§ 72-1-102(11) (West 2004), which defines a limited-access facility as 
a highway especially designated for through traffic, and over, from, or to 
which neither owners nor occupants of abutting lands nor other persons 
have any right or easement, or have only a limited right or easement of 
access, light, air, or view. 
The courts of other states have also followed the general rule that a landowner 
does not have appurtenant easements over the property of their neighbors. These 
easements only apply to the public road that abuts their property. 
As a general matter, a landowner cannot recover from a neighboring 
landowner simply because he dislikes the use to which the second 
landowner put his property. Thus, a landowner could not recover from his 
neighbor just because the other had erected a building on his own property 
which blocked the view from the first owner's land, or the visibility of the 
first owner's land. The only way to prevent a neighbor from constructing a 
building which would block one's view is to buy an easement of view. The 
logical implication of this position is that a property owner has no right to 
an unobstructed line of vision to his property from anywhere off of his 
property, absent an easement of some sort. 
8.960 Square Feet v. State, 806 P.2d 843, 845-46 (Alaska 1991) (citation and footnotes 
omitted). See also Collinson v. John L. Scott. Inc., 778 P.2d 534, 537 (Wash. App. 1989) 
("The general rule appears to be that a building or structure cannot be complained of as a 
nuisance merely because it obstructs the view of neighboring property."). 
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It is undisputed that Admiral Beverage's property was not adjacent to 1-15. It has 
at all times abutted 500 West, not the freeway. The freeway was built, and remains today, 
on property found on the far side of 500 West from the defendant's land. Defendant's 
appurtenant easements pertain to 500 West and not to 1-15. Judge Faust's decision 
correctly took this fact into consideration. "Defendant is able to assert claims for any 
severance damages relating to abutment rights pertaining to being an adjoining landowner 
to 500 West." R. 863. The district court correctly applied Utah law and should be 
affirmed. 
On appeal, the defendant does not directly address this issue. Instead, Admiral 
Beverage relies solely on Ivers v. Utah Dep't of Transp.. 2007 UT 19, 154 P.3d 802. 
Defendant correctly notes that the Utah Supreme Court held that damages caused by a 
loss of the appurtenant easement of view can be claimed, in appropriate circumstances, 
whether or not the obstruction was actually built on the condemned portion of the 
property. Ivers, 2007 UT 19 at 1J26. But defendant fails to acknowledge that the 
easement for view in Ivers clearly pertained to the state road whose reconstruction was 
alleged to have caused the loss of view. The land in Ivers was adjacent to the road in 
question. Id at [^4. Further, in Ivers the court followed Miya in describing the rights in 
question as being "easements appurtenant to the land of an abutting owner on a street." 
Ivers. 2007 UT 19 at HI3. 
Defendant errs in reading Ivers too broadly. The court did not separate the right to 
damages for a loss of view from its point of origin. The easement of view applies only to 
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the abutting road. It does not attach to other roads that may be close by. It did not attach 
to 1-15 but only to 500 West, the street adjacent to Admiral Beverage's property. 
II. UTAH DOES NOT RECOGNIZE DAMAGE CLAIMS FOR LOSS 
OF VISIBILITY 
Even if Admiral Beverage were permitted to claim loss of view damages related to 
a roadway that did not abut its property (1-15), the district court's granting of UDOT's 
motions in limine was si ill correct. All of the excluded evidence included claims for 
damages based on a loss of visibility. R. 151-63, 495-98, 656-64, 727-35, 773. 
Defendant not only acknowledges this, but argues in its brief that it is impossible to 
segregate damages caused by a loss of view from those allegedly caused by a loss of 
visibility. Brief of Defendant at 5-6, 13-16. 
But Utah does not recognize a claim for loss of visibility. 
Neither the legislature nor this court has recognized a protected 
property right in visibility of one's property from the roadway. As a result, 
the court of appeals concluded that Arby's was not entitled to present 
evidence of claimed damage to their property caused by a loss of visibility 
of the property. We agree. In Utah, landowners do not have a protected 
interest in the visibility of their property from an abutting road, even if part 
of their land has been taken in the process. 
In Utah State Road Commission v. Miya, we concluded that the 
"rights of access, light, and air are easements appurtenant to the land of an 
abutting owner on a street. We also concluded in Miya that "[a] property 
owner has no property right to a free and unrestricted flow of traffic past his 
premises, and any impairment or interference with this flow does not entitle 
the owner to compensation." Similarly, a property owner has no recognized 
property right to free and unrestricted visibility of his property by passing 
traffic, and an impairment of that visibility does not mandate compensation. 
The speculative nature of the damages sought in a claim for loss of 
visibility further supports this conclusion. As the court of appeals correctly 
noted, a claim for loss of visibility is essentially a claim for compensation 
12 
for lost business profits. Article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution 
simply does not create a protectable property interest in the mere hope of 
future sales from passing traffic. 
Because property owners have no protectable property interest in 
visibility, the trial court was correct in granting the motion in limine on this 
issue, and the court of appeals was correct in affirming. 
Ivers, 2007 UT 19 at 1fl[12-15 (citations and footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
Admiral Beverage fails to cite any precedent that would have permitted the district 
court to allow defendant to seek damages for a claim that is not recognized by Utah law. 
The district court would have erred if it permitted evidence of alleged impairment of 
visibility to be submitted contrary to the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Ivers. Far 
from distinguishing between what damage was attributable to loss of view as opposed to 
loss of visibility, the excluded evidence expressly conflated the two. Brief of Defendant 
at 5-6,13-16. 
In an effort to circumvent Ivers, Admiral Beverage relies on State Road Comm'n 
v. Rohan, 487 P.2d 857 (Utah 1971) for the proposition that damages attributed to the 
purported loss of visibility can be awarded, as long as they are mixed with other alleged 
damages and not stated as a separate amount. This is a mischaracterization of Rohan. 
Rohan involved a claim for severance damages to the remaining property after one-fifth 
of the land had been condemned for the construction of a freeway. The court upheld a 
general award of damages based on an appraisal that included consideration of a 
reduction in the property's value due to the increase in noise that would be caused by the 
adjacent freeway being built. The plurality opinion in Rohan permitted the consideration 
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of noise damage even though it could not be raised as a separate claim of damage. IdL at 
859. 
Defendant claims that, like the noise addressed in Rohan, alleged damages for loss 
of visibility can be presented as long as they are mixed with other damage claims and not 
separately presented. But the two are not similar. Rohan cited to the prior law of Utah as 
to when an increase of noise can be considered a compensable damage claim. Id. at 858 
n.4. One of the cases cited in this footnote is Twenty-Second Corp. of Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Oregon Shortline. 36 Utah 238, 103 P. 243 (1909). Oregon 
Shortline made it clear that increased amounts of noise suffered by a landowner could, in 
certain circumstances state a damage claim. 
It is true that, in addition to the foregoing cases, there are some in 
which the courts have held that noises and other interferences arising from 
the operation of railroad trains are proper elements of damage when they 
affect the use and enjoyment of property. Among this class of cases are 
those which relate to the condemnation of property for public purposes, 
including railroads, where all the property is not taken, but the property not 
taken is, nevertheless, affected, or where some easement appurtenant to the 
property not taken is interfered with so as to affect the salable or usable 
value thereof. In that class of cases noises and similar interferences which 
may affect the market value of the property not taken are ordinarily 
permitted to be shown, not as independent elements of damage, but as 
elements to be considered in connection with all other things which may 
depreciate the market value of the property interfered with but not taken. 
103 P. at 249. 
Utah law recognized noise as a damage to property, but limited recovery for it due 
to valid public policy considerations. 
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If mere annoyances from noises give a right of action for damages, then 
every one who is annoyed must be permitted to sue for and recover 
damages to the extent to which he is affected. The question therefore, in 
each case, would depend upon the intensity of the noises and the extent of 
the annoyance. 
Id 
Loss of visibility is not similar to a claim that a landowner's enjoyment of his 
property has been damaged by noise. While Utah law has recognized a limited right to 
recover for damage due to noise, it has never recognized an appurtenant easement of 
visibility. In Ivers the court held that "a property owner has no recognized property right 
to free and unrestricted visibility of his property by passing traffic." Ivers. 2007 UT 19 at 
TJ13. Defendant sought recovery for a diminution of the visibility of its property by the 
traveling public, even though the Utah Supreme Court expressly held that no such right 
existed. 
In effect, the defendant landowner claims a vested right to view and be viewed by 
passing traffic. Whether it is couched in terms of a right to view or a right of visibility, a 
landowner cannot claim a vested right in passing traffic. Ivers, 2007 UT 19 at lfl|13-15. 
Establishment and regulation of traffic movement is a function of state police powers, and 
the fact that 1-15 may bring traffic near the property does not create a vested right. The 
government may direct the traffic elsewhere without a claim for loss of property rights. 
"[W]hat the police power may give an abutting property in the way of traffic on the 
highway it may take away " Hampton v. Rd. Comm'n. 21 Utah 2d 342, 445 P.2d 
15 
708, 711 (1968). The district court correctly excluded such evidence as being 
impermissible and that decision should be affirmed on appeal. 
III. JUDGE FAUST DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION IN 
REFUSING TO REVISIT JUDGE ROTH'S PRIOR DECISION 
Defendant correctly points out that a second judge presiding over an action is not 
always bound by the interlocutory decisions of the first judge. 
A court can consider several factors in determining the propriety of 
reconsidering a prior ruling. These may include, but are not limited to, 
when (1) the matter is presented in a "different light" or under "different 
circumstances;" (2) there has been a change in the governing law; (3) a 
party offers new evidence; (4) "manifest injustice" will result if the court 
does not reconsider the prior ruling; (5) a court needs to correct its own 
errors; or (6) an issue was inadequately briefed when first contemplated by 
the court. 
Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884P.2d 1306, 1311 (Utah App. 1994). 
But showing that Judge Faust had the right to reconsider Judge Roth's decision is 
not enough. Defendant had the burden to show that Judge Faust abused his discretion in 
not doing so. 
While a case remains pending before the district court prior to any appeal, 
the parties are bound by the court's prior decision, but the court remains free 
to reconsider that decision. It may do so sua sponte or at the suggestion of 
one of the parties. And this discretionary power of reconsideration includes 
the right of the district court to decline to reopen a matter it has already 
decided. As long as the case has not been appealed and remanded, 
reconsideration of an issue before a final judgment is within the sound 
discretion of the district court. 
IHC Health Serv. Inc. v. D & K Mgmt. Inc., 2008 UT 36, ^|27, 606 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 
(footnotes omitted). 
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Defendant has failed to argue that Judge Faust abused his discretion. No such 
showing has been made. This Court should reject the defendant's law-of-the-case 
argument. 
Even if defendant had made a proper abuse of discretion argument, it would still 
fail. Defendant asks this Court to reverse the district court for no reason other than Judge 
Faust adopted a prior decision made by Judge Roth. Admiral Beverage's argument fails 
for two reasons. First, it has failed to show that Judge Faust believed himself bound by 
Judge Roth's prior decision. Judge Faust did not say he was bound by the prior decision, 
but that he was adopting it. R. 862-63. That Judge Faust had the right to reconsider 
Judge Roth's decision does not mean he had a duty to do so. 
Defendant's only argument is that Judge Roth's decision should have been rejected 
because it was made before the Utah Supreme Court issued its decision in I vers. But, like 
I vers. Judge Roth rejected the existence of a claim for loss of visibility. R. 495-98. His 
rationale is very similar to that adopted in I vers. Admiral Beverage has failed to show 
how Judge Roth's decision on this issue was contrary to I vers. 
The issues before Judge Faust were: 1) can defendant claim damages for alleged 
loss of visibility; and, 2) can defendant claim damages loss of view concerning an 
obstruction that was not part of the abutting roadway. Judge Faust made his own ruling 
on the second issue. Judge Faust should not be reversed because he adopted Judge Roth's 
ruling on loss of visibility damages. 
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The second reason why Admiral Beverage's argument fails is because defendant 
cannot show that Judge Faust's decision was in error. As shown in the prior arguments, 
Judge Faust properly excluded the defendant's evidence. That decision should be 
affirmed on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above stated reasons, plaintiff asks this Court to affirm the district court's 
granting of UDOT's three motions in limine. 
PLAINTIFF DOES NOT DESIRE ORAL 
ARGUMENT OR A PUBLISHED OPINION 
Plaintiff-appellee does not request oral argument and a published opinion in this 
matter. The questions raised in this appeal are such that plaintiff believes oral argument 
will not be of assistance to the Court in reviewing and deciding this matter. 
Plaintiff does desire to participate in oral argument if such is held by the Court. 
Respectfully submitted this £*/ day of July, 2008. 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Plaintiff/Appellee, postage prepaid, to the following on this Z./ day of July, 2008: 
REED L. MARTINEAU 
D. JASON HAWKINS 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH D E P A R T M E N T OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
A D M I R A L B E V E R A G E 
CORPORATION (Assignee of Mark 
Investment Trust); PARK CITY WEST 
& ASSOCIATES; VALLEY BANK & 
TRUST COMPANY nka BANK ONE, 
UTAH; and VALLEY MORTGAGE 
COMPANY nka UTAH INVESTMENT 
COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
UTAH D E P A R T M E N T OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
A D M I R A L B E V E R A G E 
CORPORATION, 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") filed a Motion in Limine to which 
defendant Admiral Beverage Coiporation ("Admiral") responded with a cross-motion, Motion in 
Limine of Defendant Admiral Beverage Corporation to Admit Evidence of All Factors That Affeci 
Fair Market Value ("Admiral's Motion in Limine"). While both motions are nominally focused on 
MEMORANDUM DECISION and 
ORDER (Cross-Motions in Limine) 
CONSOLIDATED: 
Case No. 970905361 CD 
Case No. 970905368CD 
Judge Stephen L. Roth 
the parties" competing views of the admissibility of basically the same evidence, they recognize that 
the real issue is the scope of severance damages that may be awarded to defendants under Utah 
condemnation law. The parties submitted memoranda supporting their own motions and opposing 
their opponents, as well as reply memoranda. The court heard argument on the motions on June 28, 
2005, where UDOT was represented by Randy S. Hunter, Assistant Attorney General, and Admiral 
was represented by Rex E. Madsen (who argued) and Reed L. Martineau, Snow Cliristensen & 
Martineau. The court gave leave to Admiral to submit a new survey in response to one submitted 
by UDOT just before the hearing. That survey was provided to the court on August 31,2005, and 
the matter was submitted for decision. Having considered the memoranda, affidavits and other 
evidence submitted, along with the arguments of counsel, the court GRANTS UDOT's Motion in 
Limine and DENIES Admiral's Motion in Limine, for the reasons set forth below. 
DECISION 
A. Factual Background. 
The relevant facts do not appear to be disputed in any material way. Admiral owns two 
adjacent lots directly to the west of the 1-15 freeway, bordering 500 West, which serves as a frontage 
road in that area, running north and south between the Admiral lots and the west side of the freeway. 
In connection with the 1-15 reconstruction project, the west side of the freeway in that area was 
moved closer to the Admiral lots, requiring that the 500 West frontage road also be moved further 
to the west and onto the east side of Admiral's property, resulting in the condemnation of what are 
now identified by UDOT as parcels 109 and 110, which are the subject of these consolidated cases. 
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Before reconstruction, the existing freeway lanes had an elevation about two feet higher than 
the surface of Admiral's property. The reconstructed freeway is elevated considerably higher, with 
a portion of the freeway wall reaching a height of about 28 feet at a point about six inches outside 
and to the west of the southeast corner of parcel 109, the former southeast corner of the Admiral 
property, and about 62 feet from the nearest point of Admiral's property remaining after the 
condemnation.1 While 500 West was reconstructed on the taken parcels, no part of the rebuilt 
freeway itself is located on that property. 
Based on an appraisal, UDOT deposited into court a total of $163,100 as payment of just 
condemnation for the taking of parcels 109 and 110. Admiral appears to have only minimal 
disagreement that the deposited amount is a fair value for the property taken, as valued on a square-
footage basis. The central issue is whether there are additional compensable severance damages to 
the remainder of Admiral's property. Based on the reports of its own expert appraisal witnesses, 
Admiral claims that the market value of the remaining property has been reduced by "(a) loss of air, 
light, view, visibility and aesthetics, and (b) increased fumes and dust from traffic traveling on the 
reconstructed 1-15 freeway . . . ." Admiral's Memorandum in Support of its Motion in Limine to 
Admit Evidence of All Factors That Affect Fair Market Value and in Opposition to Plaintiffs 
1
 Admiral originally argued that a portion of the freeway wall at issue was actually built 
within the southeast corner of parcel 109, based on UDOT engineering drawings that appeared to 
support such a conclusion. About two weeks before the hearing, however, UDOT submitted, 
through the Affidavit of Keith Hafen, a more detailed survey that showed the wall, at its nearest 
point, to be six inches outside of the condemned parcel 109. Subsequent to the hearing, Admiral had 
its own survey done, which confirmed that the wall was outside of parcel 109, although four to five 
inches at its closest point rather than six, a difference that is not material to the issues before the 
court. 
Motion in Limine ("Admiral's Memorandum in Support") at 2. UDOT contends that these rights 
are not compensable as severance damages under applicable law. 
B. Analysis. 
The factors identified by Admiral's appraisers as damaging the remaining property seem to 
fall into three categories: the loss of visibility and prominence of the remainder due to the size and 
location of the new freeway structures; loss of air and light to, and view from, the remaining 
property; and the increase in noise, dust, fumes and so on from increased traffic flow nearer to the 
remainder than the prior freeway. The claim for loss of visibility is the only subject addressed in 
UDOT's Motion in Limine, but all of these factors are addressed in Admiral's Motion in Limine, 
which is imposed in toto by UDOT. The loss of visibility issue is addressed separately as a matter 
of first impression in Utah. 
1. Loss of Visibility. 
There seems to be no dispute that reconstruction of the portion of I-15 passing by the Admiral 
property, which moved the freeway closer and significantly raised its grade, restricts the visibility 
of the remainder parcels from passing vehicles in comparison with the prior freeway configuration. 
The issue of whether reduced visibility is a compensable severance damage has not been directly 
addressed by Utah appellate courts. Nevertheless, the court believes that analogous Utah case law 
provides guidance in this area. 
A long line of Utah cases has established the principle that the appurtenant rights of an owner 
of abutting property do not include an interest in the traffic flow from a public road or highway 
passing by his property that justifies severance damages if reduced or taken away. In Hampton v. 
State Road Commission, 445 P.2d 708 (Utah 1968), the court noted that kCthe right of ingress or 
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egress to or from one's property [does not] include any right in and to existing public traffic on the 
highway, or any right to have such traffic pass by one's abutting property." Id. at 711. The court 
explained: 
The reason is that all traffic on public highways is controlled by the police power of 
the State, and what the police power may give an abutting property owner in the way 
of traffic on the highway it may take away, and by any such diversion of traffic the 
State and any of its agencies are not liable for any decrease of property values by 
reason of such diversion of traffic, because such damages are "damnum absque 
injuria'' or damage without legal injury. 
Id. at 347. See also, Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v. Hislop, 362 P.2d 580, 581 (Utah 
1961) ("The owner of land abutting on a street or highway has no property or other vested right in 
the flow of traffic on that street or highway and is not entitled to compensation when that flow of 
traffic is diminished as a result of eminent domain proceedings"); Utah State Road Commission v. 
Miya, 526 P.2d 926,928 (Utah 1974) ("A property owner has no right to a free and unrestricted flow 
of traffic past his premises, and any impairment or interference with this flow does not entitle the 
owner to compensation."); Utah Department of Transportation v. Harvey Real Estate, 2002 UT107, 
(^14 (citing Miya and quoting Hampton for the principle stated above). 
Here, a significant portion of Admiral's claimed severance is based on the reduction in 
visibility from the reconstructed freeway when compared to its original configuration. The visibility 
that was lost, under these circumstances, was necessarily a function of the passage of traffic. In other 
words, the original visibility of the site resulted from the construction of the freeway by the State, 
which exposed the Admiral property to the view of passing motorists who used the freeway as a 
route of travel. Under existing law, if the State had moved the freeway route horizontally, to a 
different location far enough from the Admiral property that it traffic no longer passed by it, the 
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deprivation of the passing traffic itself would not be a compensable injury. It is difficult to see how 
moving the freeway vertically, so that traffic continues to pass by the property but without being able 
to see it, results in an injury that is any different as a practical matter or that is legally distinctive in 
any meaningful way. The court therefore does not believe that diminishment of visibility from a 
road or highway is any more compensable as severance damages than a more general diversion of 
traffic flow would be. 
Moreover, even if a right to visibility were found to be appurtenant to landowners abutting 
a highway or road, the rights of abutting owners with respect to a freeway are significantly more 
limited. 1-15 is a "[IJimited-access facility," which is defined by statute as "a highway especially 
designated for through traffic, and over, from, or to which neither owners nor occupants of abutting 
lands nor any other persons have any right or easement, or have only a limited right or easement of 
access, light, air, or view." U.C.A. § 72-1-102 (11). This definition suggests, among other things, 
an intent to restrict the appurtenant rights of lands abutting freeways so as to limit the scope of 
severance damages attributable to such rights. 
Admiral relies in part on People v. Ricardi, 144 P.2d 799 (Cal. 1944), and subsequent 
decisions following it, for the proposition that a landowner is entitled to severance damages for the 
loss of the view of his property from a highway. The California Court of Appeals, however, 
subsequently held that Ricardi's "right to a view" does not apply to freeways. The court upheld the 
lower court's conclusion that an owner "has no legal right to a view of his property from the 
freeway:" 
A freeway is unlike a highway. An abutter/1 andowner has a right to a view from a 
public road or highway. However, while the purpose of a highway is to provide 
landowners with abutter's rights, the purpose of a freeway is to eliminate those rights. 
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People ex rel Department of Transportation v. Wilson, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 52, 55 (Cal.App. 1994) 
(citation to Ricardi omitted). The court noted that the purpose of roads or highways is to allow 
access from abutting private property and to allow travelers along the road or highway "to view a 
business, drive into it, patronize it, and reenter the highway" but that "[s]uch purposes are 
antagonistic to the purpose of a freeway," which is designed to "'prevent just that sort of thing/'* 
Id. (citations omitted). The court went on to discuss a California statute similar in import to Utah's: 
For that reason, Streets and Highway Code section 23.5 provides that owners of 
abutting lands to a freeway have limited or no right of access to or from their abutting 
lands. Obviously a freeway restricts rights of access and related rights such as the 
right to a view. 
Id. 
Therefore, even if the court were inclined to find a right to a view of one's abutting property 
from a road or highway under Utah law, the court concludes that a landowner "has no legal right to 
a view of his property from the freeway." 
2. Other Damages. 
Admiral also claims it is entitled to severance damages for "loss of air, light, view, visibility 
and aesthetics," a bundle of rights that may include, but goes beyond, the right to a view from the 
freeway, as well as for "increased fumes and dust from traffic traveling on the reconstructed 1-15 
freeway." The court concludes that Utah law does not allow recovery for such damages under the 
circumstances of these consolidated cases. 
The claimed damages appear to arise either from the elevation of the grade of the freeway 
or from increased traffic due to the freeway improvements. Neither the construction of the elevated 
ramp or the reconstruction of the freeway itself, however, occurred on Admiral's property; the only 
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improvement constructed on Admiral's property was the relocation of the 500 West frontage road. 
Utah cases have been consistent in holding that severance damages are limited to those caused by 
the taking itself or attributable to improvements constructed on the taken property. The court in 
Miya. in finding compensable the loss of view from a remainder property caused by construction of 
a highway highway structure, noted that "the loss of view occasioned by a proposed public structure 
to be erected, in part at least, upon a parcel of property taken by condemnation from a unit" was a 
factor to be taken into account in determining severance damages. Miya, 526 P.2d at 929 (emphasis 
added). 
This precept was emphasized in Utah Dep 7 of Transportation v. D 'Ambrosio, 743 P.2d 1220 
(Utah 1987), where the state took a private road to two residences, which it paved and made public 
in connection with a highway extension. The Court rejected the landowners' claim that they were 
entitled to severance damages from construction of the highway: 
The general rule is that damages attributable to the taking of others' property and the 
construction of improvements thereon are not compensable. Such damages suffered 
generally by all the property owners in the area are deemed consequential. 
Severance damages are those caused by the taking of a portion of the parcel of 
property where the taking or the construction of the improvement on that part causes 
injury to that portion of the parcel not taken. 
Id. at 1221-22 (emphasis in the original). 
The court reemphasized its D 'Ambrosio holding in Harvey Real Estate, supra, an appeal of 
a trial court's grant of the state's motion in limine excluding certain severance damage evidence. 
In Harvey, the landowner sought severance damages for the diminution in value of its remainder 
property resulting from the closure of an intersection as part of a road project for which a portion of 
its land was taken. Similar to an argument Admiral makes here, the owner contended that the 
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intersection closure "was made possible only by the taking of Harvey's property . . . . " Harvey, 2002 
UT 107, fl2. Harvey asserted that limiting severance damages to only those resulting from 
improvements constructed at least in part on the portion of the property taken conflicted with the 
broad language of U.C.A. § 78-34-10(2), which provides for assessment of damages to a remainder 
from the taking of a portion of the property and from "the construction of the improvement in the 
proposed by the plaintiff [condemning authority]." The court disagreed: 
manner 
Section 78-34-10 gives a landowner the right to present evidence of damages caused 
by the construction of the improvement made on the severed property. It does not 
given the landowner the right to present evidence of damages caused by other facets 
of the construction project. 
* * * 
We held essentially the same in Utah Department of Transportation v. D 'Ambrosio, 
743P.2d 1220,1222 (Utah 1987), although we did not reference section 78-34-10(2). 
There we stated that "severance damages are those caused by the taking of a portion 
of the parcel of property where the taking or the construction of the improvement on 
that part causes injury to that portion of the property not taken." (Emphasis added.) 
Our holding today also accords with the well-established common law principle that 
severance damages "may be made for any diminution in the value of [an owner's 
non-condemned land], as long as those damages were directly caused by the taking 
itself'and by the condemnor's use of the land taken." 26 Am.Jur. 2d Eminent Domain 
§ 368 (1996) (emphasis added) 
Id. at Tfll 10-11 (interpolations and emphasis in the original, some citations omitted). 
The court therefore concludes that damages resulting from construction of the elevated ramp 
just outside the taken parcels, as well as damages from the reconfiguration of the freeway as part of 
the reconstruction project are not compensable as severance damages under Utah law. This appears 
to include evidence related to all of "the components of severance damages" that were "taken into 
account" by Admiral's expert appraisers and enumerated at paragraph 7 of the Affidavit of Robert 
o 
A. Steele and paragraph 7 of the Affidavit of John C. Brown (Exhibits A and B, respectively, to 
Admiral's Memorandum in Support), except for "loss of parking."2 
ORDER 
It is therefore ORDERED that UDOT's Motion in Limine is GRANTED, and Admiral's 
Motion in Limine to Admit Evidence of All Factors That Affect Fair Market Value is DENIED. 
DATED this S/ day of October, 2005. 
2
 The facts of this case illustrate the sometimes arbitrary nature of the rule that the court has 
relied on in making its decision here. Without so finding, it is certainly possible that the court's 
decision would have been significantly different if the offending elevated freeway ramp had been 
built six inches within, rather than six inches outside, the condemned parcel 109. In this regard 
Admiral has advanced an argument that has special appeal given the harsh result the difference of 
a matter of inches may produce. That argument proposes that if a taking is part of an integrated 
project (which Admiral argues is the case here), the landowner should be entitled to compensation 
for damages resulting from specific improvements related to the purpose of the taking and causing 
specific injury to the remainder, even if they were not constructed within the immediate boundaries 
of the take. See Admiral Beverage Corporation's Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion in 
Limine . . ., at 6-10. This approach recognizes that the actual reduction in value of the remainder 
from the improvement, as a practical matter, may be no different when it is located just within or just 
outside of the taken parcel. 
The court believes, however, that the repeated (and apparently unequivocal) holdings of the 
Utah Supreme Court, as addressed above, constrain it from seriously considering such an approach 
at this level, because it would involve a departure from current law. In this regard, the appellate 
:ourts are better equipped to identify, analyze and resolve the competing public and private interests, 
is well as the legal complications, that would be implicated in such a change in approach to 
severance damages. The resolution of these issues must therefore be left to some future appeal. 
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